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Individual Telecommunications Tariffs in Chinese Communities: History as a 
Mirror of the Future, and Relevance for Mobile Service Development in China  
 
H. Chen, L-F Pau 
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University 




This paper addresses mobile service pricing and affordability issues in China. Taking history as a mirror, it shows 
individual tariffs existed at the dawn of telephony. A vision of future mobile services with individual tariffs is 
formalized which will suit specially well the culture of communities rooted in Chinese traditions. An analysis of current 
tariff conditions in China shows community-based individual tariffs will speed up the diffusion of mobile services to the 
majority of populations and benefit both economically and sociologically the development in China 
 





The focus of this paper is on pricing and affordability of 
mobile services, addressing especially factors essential 
to a sustainable adoption of wireless communication in 
China. Taking a historical perspective around the world, 
it shows first that telecommunication services started in 
the 1880’s with prices set for each user individually; an 
analysis of current situation in mobile communications 
especially in China is followed by a vista of the 
situation in approx. year 2030 (Section 2); it then 
presents (Section 3) a visionary version of mobile user 
pricing suiting especially well the Chinese culture of 
communities and the service dependencies therein (礼尚
往来 ). The paper concludes in Section 4 with the 
suggestions that the adequacy of individual tariffs inside 
Chinese communities, further compounded with 
growing service creation skills, will fuel a fast 
improving affordability and use of mobile services.  
 
The economic theory of pricing has traditionally been 
derived for physical goods, and from different angles: 
1. either from a static equilibrium between supply 
and demand [1], including auction; 
2. or taking in consideration ranked preferences for 
individual price formation [2]; 
3. or reflecting price dynamics with endogenous 
fluctuations due to market restructuring [3]. 
 
Most traditional telecommunication pricing schemes 
have been variants of the above, assuming limited 
capacity in either bandwidth or transmission capacity. 
These two assumptions have been made largely 
erroneous with the advent first of fiber optic 
transmission, and next of advanced radio 
coding/modulation/spectrum usage techniques. 
 
Unfortunately, in general only little has been published 
around service pricing and affordability for end users, 
which furthermore takes social networks into account, 
as in this paper. 
 
2. THE HISTORY, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF 
WILRLESS SERVICE TRAIFFING AND 
AFFORDABILITY 
 
This section is successively addressing the telephony 
usage and pricing in general in the 1880’s, thereafter the 
current situation in China for wireless communications, 
and proposes finally a vision about wireless service 
pricing in e.g. the 2030’s. (Date picked randomly to 
reflect the social and technology legacy and adoption 
curves.) 
 
2.1 Users, Demand and Supply in the 1880’s 
 
At the dawn of the telephony services history, there 
were individual tariffs! The telephone was patented by 
Alexander Graham Bell in 1876. For quite some years, 
and in some markets, it served mainly some high level 
civil servants and privileged people (trade, news), and 
was the symbol of wealth and social rank. Telephone 
subscribers were not designated by a number, but by 
their name; picking up the phone would get the operator, 
who would then ring and connect the desired party by a 
polite support staff protocol. 
 
As a luxury service at that time, the demand for 
telephony was limited (lack of network capacity effect). 
Phone calls were mainly local, with national and 
international calls a rare phenomenon except in some 
key cities. The demand patterns by called party, 
between office and home, or between national parties 
and international parties, were by and large not analyzed, 
as their influence on telephone company tariffs was 
minimal. Each individual was eventually satisfied, or 
not, in a binary way with whatever the telephone 
companies offered (since the person was rich or the 
services were paid by the government). The individual 
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demands were price insensitive, which resulted in an 
inelastic demand curve as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Regarding the supply of telephony services, there were 
in general only geographically limited pure monopolies, 
and the capacity in each country was dominated by two 
or three local companies able to invest in 
interconnections.  
 
From the very beginning, although the reduced sets of 
telephone users and suppliers were restricted, charging 
patterns diverged very early between flat rates and 
individual usage-based rates. Numbers of call attempts, 
physical destination and the duration were manually 
recorded – but the pricing of the calls was a matter 
between the telephone company sales person and the 
service customer (who was then not a subscriber); usage, 
rank, fame, location were all taken into account, and the 
settlement was done by a bank note or cash. In some 
countries, an annual contract fee was charged, while 
others started with flat rates for a fixed number of calls 
(not even based on duration or distance). 
 
Case 1: In Sweden, year 1881, the city of Gävle called 
for bids to supply a local telephone system. The Bell 
Company in Stockholm offered to install and operate a 
system for SEK 200 per user per year (2004 value = 
SEK 9102)1, based on a minimum of fifty five-year user 
contracts. The local enterprise Ericsson offered SEK 
275 per user (2004 value = SEK 12514) and thereafter 
to operate it for SEK 56 (2004 value = SEK 2458) per 
user per year2. The rate of annual operation cost, to 
Gross National Product (GNP) of SEK 310/capita in 
18813, is 18%.  
                                                        
1 "Consumer Price Index," Statistics Sweden, 2004. 
2 "Lars Magnus Ericsson - A brief biography," 
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson. Available: 
http://www.ericsson.com/about/compfacts/history/lars_magnu
s_ericsson/company_born.shtml. 
3 "The gross domestic product of Sweden and its 
composition 1861-1955.", Östen Johansson. 
Case 2: In Los Angeles (U.S.A), in 1888 the common 
policy of the telephone company was high-quality 
service and high costs. “The minimum flat rate in 
central Los Angeles in 1888, for example, was USD 4 
per month (2004 value = USD 80.37)4 plus two cents a 
connection after the fortieth call (2004 value = USD 
0.40). This rate equaled about 10% of the average 
nonfarm employee’s wages” [4]. At the time, the 
penetration rate of telephone in the U.S is 1.08%5. 
 
In all cases, the supply was scarce and inelastic to prices, 
as there was no choice, nor competitive mechanisms. 
And, although prices were fixed individually or bundled 
into packages with fixed numbers of calls, they were 
extremely high, which resulted in the exclusion of the 
majority of population from accessing the services due 
to unaffordability.  
 
2.2 Current Situation for Mobile Communications 
and Especially in Relation to China 
 
The worldwide GSM mobile phone users reached 1 
billion in February 2004, almost one sixth of the world’s 
population 6 ; besides other mobile communications 
standards also have user and subscriber bases adding up 
to that number, for a worldwide grand total of 
approximately 1.4 Billion (1,340,667.7) at the end of 
20037.  
 
In China, the first public mobile operator (China 
Telecom) started its services in 1987 under heavy 
government involvement and as a state-owned 
enterprise, with 700 subscribers. With a fierce growth, 
in October 2003, the number of mobile users exceeds 
the number of fixed telephone users8. By the end of 
2003, the overall penetration rate among the total 
population was approximately 20.9%. There were 
approximately 290.31 million mobile users at the end of 
March 2004, with a growth of 60 millions of users per 
year, according to MII statistics9. 
 
In China, mobile tariffs, as part of the 
telecommunication tariffs, are guided by “Regulations 
of the People’s Republic of China on 
Telecommunications” [5]. A Telecommunications Law 
is supposed to be promulgated in 2005. Tariffs are 
divided into three categories: 
1. Government-set tariffs; 
                                                        
4 "Consumer Price Indexes," Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
U.S. Department of Labor, 2004. 
5 “Penetration rate of Consumer Technologies 
(1876-present)”, FCC, U.S.A  
6 "GSM: the business of a billion people." Cannes: GSM 
Association Press Release, 2004.  
7 "World Telecommunication Indicators - Basic 
indicators," ITU, 2003. Available: 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/at_glance/basic03.pdf 
8 "Telecommunication Industry Monthly Statistics, 
October 2003," Ministry of Information Industry, China. 
9 "Telecommunication Industry Indicator, 1st quarter 
2004," Ministry of Information Industry, China. 
 
Figure 1: Service demands at the dawn of telephony. 
A, B, C represents the individual demands, which were 
limited and price insensitive. The average telephony 
demand curve at the dawn of telephony is also shown in 
the bold curve, which is inelastic. All voice calls here 
are assumed for the same destination/distance. 
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2. Government-guided tariffs; 
3. Market-based tariffs. 
 
Basic mobile services (voice call, roaming, and long 
distance call) can follow either government-set tariffs, 
government-guided tariffs or market-based tariffs. 
Value-added mobile services (call forward, line 
identification, SMS, etc) can follow government-guided 
tariffs or market-based tariffs. When there is intensive 
competition, the tariffs can be set based on the market 
mechanism. “State-aid” operators are entitled to set 
price fluctuating within 10% of the government-set 
tariffs. There are two dominant mobile operators (China 
Mobile and China Unicom), plus two minor ones. 
 
The current mobile tariffs are based on a regulation 
issued in 1994 by the former Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications. Postpaid users pay a monthly 
subscription fee of CNY 50 and the tariff is CNY 
0.40/minute for local calls, CNY 0.60/minute when 
roaming. Prepaid users do not pay the monthly 
subscription fee, and the corresponding tariffs are CNY 
0.60/minute for local calls and CNY 0.80/minute when 
roaming. 
Due to high income disparity in China today, the ratio 
of the ARPU10 to disposable income urban and rural11 
(see table 1) reminds closely of the situation in the 
1880’s described above in Section 2.1, with a ratio of 
18.40% and 26% respectively. The overall average 
ARPU is CNY 76.3/month (2003). The ratio of the 
overall average mobile voice usage cost per year, to 
Chinese GDP per inhabitant CNY 9025 (2003) is of 
10.14 %. Whereas the overall mobile penetration rate in 
China among the total population was approximately 
20.9% at the end of 2003, with high usage subscribers 
representing an estimated 20% of the subscriber base, or 
                                                        
10 The ARPU data are acquired from the 2003 annual 
results of China Mobile (Hong Kong) limited and 2003 annual 
results of China Unicom Limited.  
11 “Statistical Communiqué on the 2003 National 
Economic and Social development,” National Bureau of 
Statistics of China.  
4.2% of the population. For all practical matters, high 
volume users (privates or enterprises) still largely 
negotiate their rates. Meanwhile, the majority of the 
population (79%) still can not afford the expense on 
wireless communications, reminding of the situation 
depicted in Section 2.1. 
 
Although the regulatory situation has obviously evolved 
rapidly, in purely economic terms, demand and supply 
are not yet happening on an equal-access basis and the 
suppliers are closer to an oligopolistic behavior than to a 
pure competitive one, partly due to the government 
directives. 
 
2.3 A Vision of the Tariffing Situation in Approx. 
Year 2030 (“The Bright Future”) 
 
Twenty years from now on, advanced personal 
communication technologies enable people to stay 
connected anytime, anywhere with access network 
alternatives. Users’ devices can seamlessly roam 
between PAN, WLAN, WAN, with new services yet 
unknown. With a penetration rate of wireless devices of 
over 100 percent over the entire population in most 
countries, how mobile services are provided will be 
quite different from now.  
 
While connectivity is the most cherished property as in 
year 2000 (see [6]), the key values of mobile service in 
the 2030’s will be totally different. By a combination of 
a large number of users, technology improvements, and 
operator productivity gains, the pure transport and 
access tariffs for wireless will have plummeted to very 
low values. Content-based service will generate certain 
revenue. Content exists in two variants: 
1. “static”, from data warehouses with only slow 
modifications;  
2. “dynamic”, from real-time information sensors 
and other sources, including user-originated content. 
 
By profiling and data mining, besides personalization 
selections, the service operators will know in real time 
much more about users than now. However, in an age 
with information “overload”, static content has no 
commercial value except for those with copyright of the 
creators, or information access provisions. 
Advertisement will generate some revenue for service 
providers, but it will probably not be sufficient to 
support a whole mobile communication industry living 
from the “law of large numbers” and from very low 
tariffs. User driven service personalization will enhance 
some tariffs, but the cost of provisioning of such 
services will offset revenue gains.  
 
Mirroring the early trend in video/broadcasting 
industries for dynamic content, the relative share in 
tariff bundles of the intellectual property right owner 
will be larger; the multiplication of dynamic content 
channels will add to tariff bundles price pressure.  
 
Table1: Ratio of ARPU to disposable income. 













We approximate urban users to be the postpaid users, and 
rural users to be the prepaid users. The weighted ARPU is 
the average revenue per user, weighted within each 
population category (urban/postpaid, rural/prepaid) by 
weight equal to market share applied to published ARPU of 
two large mobile operators: China mobile and China 
Unicom. 
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Consequently by say 2030, the true value of wireless 
services lies in the interactions, where the services are 
formed as a result of multiparty interactions. These 
interactions can be divided into three categories: 
1. Community based human-to-human 
interactions; 
2. Cluster based machine-to-machine interactions; 
3. Human-to-machine interactions. 
 
In this paper, we focus on the first category. Sociologist 
Barry Wellman [7] had defined communities as: 
“Networks of interpersonal ties that provide sociability, 
support, information, a sense of belonging, and social 
identity.” We assume that all the members of such a 
community rely amongst other communication 
mechanisms, on the usage of mobile technology in the 
2030’s.  
 
Because of their business, sociological or process-linked 
nature, the communities mentioned above rely on a 
membership fee (in kind or in money, eventually free) 
and on managed access privileges, akin operators 
customer care administration, but in diverse forms and 
with more freedom in the organization thereof. More 
precisely, belonging to community requires an identity 
and membership for a user in order to receive services. 
The community provides collectively information, 
know-how, and services to members through 
interactions and access to static or dynamic content. The 
access to the services inside a community is based on 
prices and based on competition, or possibly quasi 
real-time spot service prices. There are also prices for 
community peering arrangements, or 
community-to-community interactions, but these may 
be on a flat basis once a service-level agreement has 
been enacted between them. One key driver of these 
communities is obviously the affordability in economic 
terms, and the obligation in social terms, to join one or 
several communities. Section 3 explains in more detail 
the cost the revenue formation justifying this 
affordability.  
 
The above analysis leads directly to pointing at the 
future potential of individual tariffs between now and 
the 2030’s, although these would obviously be provided 
in a completely different way to the 1880’s in terms of 
user population, technologies and management 
processes. 
 
In China, the traditional “families” and groups culture 
(人以群分) leads to more diverse communities. In 
addition to business, occupations and hobbies, 
communities are often formed under a same origin, or 
under a same dialect [8]. The above pricing settlement 
arrangements suit especially well the various 
communities. Take the example of a family-based 
community: the flat rate will be very low (close to zero), 
similarly within a rural village. But the differences lie in 
the fact that in a formally organized community, “such 
as in a village”, affordability will be higher as set 
largely by users themselves in view of their social, 
economic and information needs, which may result in 
non-zero membership fees. 
 
3. INDIVIDUAL TARIFFS 
 
3.1 Definition of Individual Tariffs for a Set of 
Communication Services 
 
“Individual tariff” means that each individual sets a 
tariff for himself/herself for a specific set of services 
provided by the community, whether this service is 
user-defined or community-defined. Even if that 
individual belongs, say to an enterprise, the members of 
the enterprise may have different individual tariffs, 
simply because their service demand and content flow 
(contributions and receipts) are different. Even, different 
users of the identical service (if any such exists) may 
value and price it differently as they decide to belong to 
different communities as their choices. 
 
In the definition above each community ends up 
supplying a number of services of which only some are 
initiated by consensus at community level or by the 
service manager. A community does not need to own 
part or the entire fixed and wireless transmission 
infrastructure, which can be sourced competitively from 
an infrastructure owner. 
 
The above definition says nothing about the service 
provisioning duration the community commits to its 
members, or which communities commit to between 
themselves. Duration of the service will be one attribute 
in the multi-attribute service demand from the user in a 
community; e.g. sporadic uses are possible, just as are 
long term ones, but the difference with today is that they 
can be different and user-specific. 
 
The above definition says nothing either about the 
transparency of prices and pricing provisions. More 
precisely, the information disclosure rules are of three 
types at least, with one between the member and his 
community (especially if this is managed formally), one 
within a community, and the last one between 
communities. These information disclosure rules may 
lead to price equalization but this effect is twice limited 
in that it can only happen for the same service, while 
each community member will have a different service 
profile. 
 
Very importantly, per this definition, when the end user 
requests a certain service from a community, he/she is 
also responsible for the existence and survival of the 
community through contributions (money, but also 
information, knowledge). The individual will take and 
share the risk if the service is underfunded and ceases to 
exist. So, if the user appreciates the service, he/she may 
end up paying slightly more than other members, or 
even than users of the same service in other 
communities, to ensure the existence of the service. The 
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person can also consider paying an insurance premium 
to the community to cover against the risk of service 
loss. 
 
By paying an individually negotiated premium, which 
can be a very small amount of money, the user 
maintains his access to services, but also by mutualising 
this risk, he contributes to the survival of the community 
[9]. 
 
There are several countries where some operators are on 
an experimental basis, or publicly, having individual 
tariffs which are not just options inside or outside a 
wireless “subscription plan/bundle”: Estonia, Norway 
and South Africa. In first two cases, it is part of business 
model and last one as part of policy to balance with 
disposable income (“universal service provisioning”). 
 
3.2 Business Model of a Community 
 
The income of a community will be made up of a 
combination of: 
1. the member fee (once per year); 
2. the competitive specific service usage revenues 
within the community; 
3. service usage revenues generated from 
non-members; 
4. the possible premium income from members 
who select to cover themselves against specific service 
disruption;  
5. flat fees from other communities; 
6. and, last but not least, contributions in kind 
(work, information, know-how, knowledge, innovation) 
by members.  
 
On the cost side, they include: 
1. costs of managing community memberships; but 
this cost does not bear marketing and publicity costs, so 
it will be far less than with today’s public operators; 
2. investments in infrastructures and possibly 
service access devices; 
3. partial service creation expenses, possibly 
shared with community users or other communities; 
4. service provisioning and operations expenses, 
with in some cases community members being 
member-employees;  
5. flat fees to other communities; 
6. and, last but not least, intellectual property right 
expense from service creation and innovation, and from 
access to information or knowledge shared in the 
community. 
 
We estimate that the community management overhead 
share will be 25%, the community service creation share 
60% and the transport plus access share (to 
infrastructure owner) will be 15% of the total costs. 
 
3.3 The Demand Analysis 
 
The total demand will be large, as people can 
personalize their services according to their needs, and 
furthermore because community proliferation may 
multiply the effect. Compared to the situation with 
generic public services in limited number, used by very 
many, communities offer viable alternatives in terms of 
revenue and demand. The reason is that within a 
community, the above two multiplicity factors are 
replaced by four: 
1. number of community members; 
2. overlapped sub-communities that share some 
common interests but have some interests and service 
demands different from others; 
3. number of specific services for a 
sub-community;  
4. number of common services to all members in 
the community.  
 
These four distributions allow to replace flat rates for all, 
by individual tariffs, subject to the condition that each 
community has detailed network management and 
monitoring tools to be able in real-time as well over 
membership durations to quantify equilibrium 
break-even tariffs (see [10]). People will pay the amount 
of money, and put in their individual contributions, 
exactly according to how they value the personalized 
service bundles offered or requested by them. This 
results in price insensitive individual demands. 
Although for each specific service, the preference from 
each user will be different, but the average demand 
across large number of user again leads to a price 
inelastic demand curve (see Figure 2); in this way, we 
are back in history (see Figure 1). However, the new 
demand curve is much more to the right of in absolute 
value in the “number of service requests” axis and much 
lower in the price axis.  
 
Case 3: A good example of community services are 
from the largest Chinese game community “Lian 
Zhong” (联众世界  www.ourgame.com). It offers 
 
Figure 2: Service demand for one specific service “S” at 
2030’s. 
A, B and C represent individual A’s service profile: (S, 
A1, A2, etc), individual B’s service profile: (S, B1, B2, 
etc) and individual C’s service profile: (S, C1, C2, etc). 
The average demand for service “S” is shown in the 
bold curve. Note there is a “service proliferation effect” 
driving the curve slope. 
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online and mobile gaming, which include board games, 
card games and arcade games. It has over 130 million 
members, including 1 million paid members. Member 
fees are CNY 35 (90 days) or CNY 120 (1 year). 
However, membership days can be traded into credits 
which can be spent in the games. (E.g. 10 days of 
membership for 300 credits.) Paid members can, among 
other services, buy credits, have privilege joining and 
selecting the games, set up their sub-communities and 
can enter the “hall of fame” based on their scores and 
credits. Normal members can access common game 
services, with limited capability; they can not buy 
credits but have to earn them in the games. There are 
over 3600 sub-communities which are formed under 
different basis. An average sub-community has 600 
members, and over 20% are paid members. Besides the 
common services, members in each sub-community can 
have their own specific services. Generally, each 
sub-community offers 2-3 specific services, like 
monthly training or tournaments but tailored to their 
favorite games and within a closed community. 
Currently, the access to services offered by 
sub-communities is free. 
 
3.4 The Supply Analysis 
 
The supply of services will be abundant, and the price 
will be low, driven not only by the deregulation of 
telecommunication services  and  technology 
advances, but above all by the freedom to define, 
request and bear a share of the risk around service 
creation. In the Chinese case, and maybe others, 
additional factors are the traditions within a community 
and their closed nature.  
 
Still backbone transmission will be essential, as will be 
different authentication/roaming/settlement functions, 
but it remains to be seen if traditional operators born in 
mindset in the 1880’s (analog voice) or 2000’s (wireless) 
can offer competitive services in flexibility, price, 
quality and scalability to what some larger communities 
may do themselves. Do not forget that due to exploding 
traffic demand, and competition driven by many 
community-clients, the revenue from pure transport or 
access will become minimal compared to the added 
value of personalized services. 
 
4. CONCLUSION: INDIVIDUAL TARIFFS IN 
CHINA? 
 
The above analysis and evolution is highly relevant to 
the cultural, technical and sociological evolution in 
China – it shows a pattern in China today as to mobile 
adoption and affordability similar to the early days in 
the 1880’s for fixed telephony on the user side.  
 
A graduate adoption of community-based individual 
tariffs, first on connectivity, then on content, and finally 
on interactions, will speed up the diffusion of mobile 
services for the majority of population in China. While 
various demands are met individually by user-set 
affordability, China can avoid the competitive model 
between large operators offering reduced set of 
standardized services and at the same time obtain a 
sustainable development in economic aspect.  
 
One the other hand, the importance of individual and 
community pricing scheme is furthermore compounded 
by the importance in China of regional dialect and 
regional traditions as well as community demographics.  
 
Community-based individual tariffs can be fueled by the 
very fast adoption of new technologies (WLAN etc.), 
and cultural linked services (e.g. mobile gaming). 
Furthermore, the skills base in software for service 
creation is a pre-requisite, the very presence of which in 
China may further accelerate this evolution by 
community based service needs. 
 
However, the vision of individual tariffs envisioned here 
is not implemented in China, nor yet supported by 
regulatory policies. A balance has to be found between 
the emergence of communities, government policies and 
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